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Abstract 
 
Antibiotic drugs have been one of modern medicine’s success stories, yet the 
underpinnings of that success are being unraveled by the alarming rate of bacterial resistance, 
coupled with the abandonment of antibiotic research and development programs by the large 
pharmaceutical companies.  In order to mitigate the human and economic toll associated with 
antibiotic resistance, policymakers need to develop appropriate incentives for both antibiotic 
development and antibiotic usage.  This paper reviews the unique problems inherent in the 
antibiotic market and discusses the current policy options proposed by the medical community as 
well as by legal scholars.  Finally, the paper proposes a solution based on de-linking the financial 
incentives for innovation from the market-based incentives for consumption. 
 1 
 
 [It] is time to close the book on infectious diseases and declare the war against 
pestilence won.
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Antibiotic resistance is one of the most threatening public health crises to face modern 
medicine today.  We are long past the golden age of antibiotic therapy development lasting from 
the 1940s through the 1980s, where the pharmaceutical industry successfully introduced more 
than 100 antibiotics to the market and where resistance was not yet an issue.
2  Today, we face the 
grim reality of climbing bacterial resistance to antibiotics coupled with a decline in antibiotic 
innovation, potentially leading to what some scholars refer to as the “pre-antibiotic era.”
3 
Beginning with the discovery of penicillin in 1928, the widespread and successful 
dissemination of antibiotic treatment was “among the most important public health interventions 
in the last century.”
4  Health outcomes improved dramatically as once fatal infections were 
brought under control through the use of these drugs.
5  Indeed, the foundation of modern 
medicine presupposes the ready availability of effective antibiotics in order to perform a host of 
                                                 
1 This is a statement allegedly made by the United States Surgeon General William H. Stewart in the 1960s, after a 
wave of antibiotic therapy successes.  See Brad Spellberg et. al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A 
Call to Action for the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 46 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 155, 156 (2008) [hereinafter Spellberg et. al., A Call to Action]; see also William M. Sage & 
David A. Hyman, Combating Microbial Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 781, 784 (2010) (attributing quote to Stewart).  One commentator, however, has been unsuccessful in locating 
a trustworthy primary source for the quote.  Although it might turn out to be the case that this particular phrase is 
merely an “urban legend” in the infectious disease community, commentators agree that the statement reflected a 
more confident era regarding the success of antibiotics.  See Brad Spellberg, Letter to the Editor, Dr. William H. 
Stewart: Mistaken or Maligned?, 47 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 294, 294 (2008).    
2 See Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 611, 616 
(2005).  
3 See Roger M. Echols et. al., Editorial Comment, Antibiotic Development – Déjà vu: Are We Facing the 
“Preantibiotic Era” Again?, 15 INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 75, 75 (2007); Otto Cars & Per 
Nordberg, Antibiotic Resistance – The Faceless Threat, in THE GLOBAL THREAT OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: 
EXPLORING ROADS TOWARDS CONCERTED ACTION 1 (2004), available at http://www.Dhf.Uu.Se/Antibiotics-
Participant/New-Pdf/Faceless-Threat.pdf (“[A] potential post-antibiotic era is threatening present and future medical 
advances.”). 
4 Conan MacDougall & Ron E. Polk, Antimicrobial Stewardship Programs in Health Care Systems, 18 CLINICAL 
MICROBIOLOGY REVIEWS 638, 638 (2005). 
5 See Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 783 (describing how the same infection that killed President Calvin 
Coolidge’s son was contracted by President Roosevelt’s son, but was successfully treated by a sulfa-based 
antibiotic).   2 
 
advanced procedures, such as cancer treatments, organ transplants, and other complicated 
surgeries, that carry the risk of infection.
6  Over time, though, bacteria began to develop 
resistance to these drugs.  While bacterial resistance is not a new phenomenon,
7 in the past the 
pharmaceutical industry has supplied a sufficient number of new antibiotics to cover the 
resistance rate.
8  Today, however, we face a mutually reinforcing problem.  Not only has the rate 
of resistance been on the rise, but the pipeline of new antibiotics to combat these resistant 
bacteria has largely run dry.
9  Large scale-pharmaceutical companies have slowed, if not halted 
altogether, their antibiotic research and development programs due to the drug’s low profitability 
profile, and the medical community is worried that the small pharmaceutical companies and the 
biotechnology firms that remain in the space will not be able to serve as a long-term viable 
replacement.  The need for new antibiotics is at the greatest it has ever been, as we are even 
beginning to see some bacterial strains that are resistant to all modern antibiotics.
10  
 How did we find ourselves in such a predicament?  It is certainly not for a lack of 
attention to the matter:  the Infectious Diseases Society of America (the “IDSA”), the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (the “CDC”), the Food and Drug Administration (the “FDA”), 
the National Institutes of Health (the “NIH”), members of the medical community, and legal 
scholars have all been alerting policymakers to the problem of antibiotic resistance.
11  Despite 
                                                 
6 See Cars & Nordberg, supra note 3, at 1.  
7 English hospitals detected bacteria that were resistant to penicillin within 10 years of the drug’s introduction to 
patients.  See Cars & Nordberg, supra note 3, at 1.     
8 See MacDougall & Polk, supra note 4, at 638. 
9 See ABIGAIL COLSON, EXTENDING THE CURE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE GROWING THREAT OF ANTIBIOTIC 
RESISTANCE 1 (2008).   
10 Acinetobacter and Stenotrophomonas are both multi-drug resistant pathogens that in some cases cannot be treated 
by modern antibiotics.  The only remaining option has been an old antibiotic, colistin, whose use has been greatly 
discouraged due to its high toxicity levels.  See Cars & Nordberg, supra note 3, at 2.      
11 See Interagency Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance, A Public Health Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial 
Resistance; Part 1: Domestic Issues (June 5, 2002), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/actionplan/aractionplan.pdf.  The Task Force consisted of the CDC, the FDA, the 
NIH, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, the Health Care Financing Administration, the Health 
Resources and Services Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, the Department 3 
 
these multiple calls to arms, little has been done to move the issue outside the realm of scholarly 
debate into tangible action.
12  There are perhaps several explanations for this lack of movement, 
from insufficient levels of coordination among the relevant parties to considerable dissension 
within the field as to the appropriate remedial measures.
13  Moreover, attempts by members of 
Congress to propose legislation designed to address antibiotic resistance, albeit primarily in the 
context of anti-bioterrorism, have thus far proved futile as none of the proposed bills have been 
enacted into law.
14   
Combating antibiotic resistance is not only a medical necessity, but an economic one as 
well.  Resistant infections are much more expensive to treat than non-resistant ones, as those 
patients require longer hospitalization stays and treatment programs.
15  The risk of mortality is 
also greater for patients with resistant infections, which, aside from the human loss, imposes an 
additional economic cost on society.
16  Moreover, the cost of continually researching and 
                                                                                                                                                            
of Veterans Affairs, and the Environmental Protection Agency.  See also INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOC'Y OF AM., BAD 
BUGS, NO DRUGS: AS ANTIBIOTIC DISCOVERY STAGNATES ... A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS BREWS (July 2004) 
[hereinafter BAD BUGS]. 
12 See John S. Bradley et. al., Infectious Diseases Society of America, Anti-Infective Research and Development – 
Problems, Challenges, and Solutions, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 68, 68 (2007) (noting that two years after the 
IDSA’s publication of Bad Bugs, No Drugs, “very little has changed”); Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 785 
(“Federal and state regulators have not ignored these issues, but they have had limited success in solving them.”); 
Spellberg et. al., A Call to Action, supra note 1, at 156 (“Unfortunately,...the resulting publicity and efforts to 
stimulate the adoption of solutions to spur new antibiotic discovery have failed.”).   
13 An example of internal policy discord within the medical community is the debate over the effectiveness of 
antibiotic cycling as a method to slow resistance.  Cycling programs use a scheduled rotation of antibiotics to 
minimize the emergence of resistant strains and are generally limited to intensive care units.  See MacDougall & 
Polk, supra note 4, at 650. While some in the medical community champion cycling programs, see Marin H. Kollef, 
Is Antibiotic Cycling the Answer to Preventing the Emergence of Bacterial Resistance in the Intensive Care Unit?, 
43 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S82 (2006), others doubt these programs’ effectiveness due to poor compliance 
and to the lack of data supporting their validity.  See MacDougall & Polk, supra note 4, at 651; see also Erwin M. 
Brown & Dilip Nathwani, Antibiotic Cycling or Rotation: A Systematic Review of the Evidence of Efficacy, 55 J. 
ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 6 (2005).   
14 See Jessica P. Schulman, Patents and Antibiotic Resistance, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 230-33 (2009), for a 
discussion of the legislative history of the Protecting America in the War on Terror Act of 2005, the Project 
BioShield II Act of 2005, and the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007.   
15 See Ramanan Laxminarayan, Introduction to BATTLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND PESTICIDES: AN 
ECONOMIC APPROACH 3 (Ramanan Laxminarayan ed. 2003); Kades, supra note 2, at 625 (estimating that a patient 
with penicillin-resistant gonorrhea costs twelve to fifteen times more than treating a patient with a non-resistant 
strain).  
16 Such economic loss would include lost productivity.  See Laxminarayan, supra note 15.  4 
 
developing new drugs to replace old ones that have lost their effectiveness diverts money and 
resources that could be used to develop drugs for other diseases.
17  
This paper seeks to examine the unique problems inherent in the antibiotic market, briefly 
review current policy options, and propose an optimal mix of solutions aimed at increasing 
financial incentives for innovation and decreasing inappropriate antibiotic usage.  The paper 
proceeds as follows.  Part I reviews the relationship between antibiotic use and antibiotic 
resistance.  Part II focuses on the benefits and drawbacks of using a conservation-based approach 
to combat antibiotic resistance.  Part III discusses why the financial incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to develop antibiotics and for patients to use them appropriately are 
suboptimal.  Part IV engages in a policy analysis and proposes ways to financially incentivize 
both antibiotic research and development and antibiotic conservation by relying on market 
signals.  The paper then concludes.   
It is important to keep in mind that that neither “more antibiotics” nor “less antibiotic 
usage” are end goals themselves; they are only intermediate goals towards the real objective of 
reducing the harmful effects of antibiotic resistance.
18  It should not matter, then, whether this 
outcome is achieved through the development of new drugs, through the slowing of bacterial 
resistance itself via conservation programs, or through some combination thereof.  What 
complicates this discussion, though, is that these pathways can often work at cross-purposes.  
Thus, it will be crucial for an effective policy analysis to understand how innovation and 
conservation interact in order to craft an overall effective solution towards battling antibiotic 
resistance.   
                                                 
17 Id.  However, most commentators would argue that there is not enough expenditure on antibiotic research and 
development, especially as compared to drugs for chronic and lifestyle conditions.  See infra Part III.A for further 
discussion on the challenges facing antibiotic development.    
18 See Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and 
Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67, 67-69 (2005) [hereinafter Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain]. 5 
 
I.  ANTIBIOTICS AND RESISTANCE: A BRIEF BACKGROUND 
The story of the development of antibiotics has a well-known introduction.  In 1928, 
Alexander Fleming inadvertently discovered penicillin when one of his bacterial cultures of 
Staphylococcus aureus was killed off by bread mold that had contaminated the dish.
19  
Subsequently in the 1930s, researchers discovered the antibacterial properties of another 
compound: sulfonamides.
20  Sulfa drugs, as they were called, were the first antibiotics to be 
prescribed to the public and were effective against a range of infections, especially those caused 
by streptococci bacteria.
21  Since then, antibiotic research has produced numerous antibiotic 
therapies to treat human, as well as animal, infections.
22  Along with general improvements to 
sanitation, the availability of effective antibiotics helped to usher in a new era of public health 
and welfare.  Within the first twenty years of antibiotics’ introduction, the median life span in the 
United States improved by eight years, from 62 to 70.
23     
                                                 
19 See Kades, supra note 2, at 614; COLSON, supra note 9, at 1.  It was not until the late 1930s that a team of 
researchers was able to purify the penicillin and scientifically prove its antibacterial properties.  See David Ho, 
Scientists & Thinkers: Alexander Fleming, TIME, Mar. 29, 1999, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,990612-1,00.html.  Penicillin was subsequently introduced to 
the market in the early 1940s.  See BAD BUGS, supra note 11, at 10.   
20 See COLSON, supra note 9, at 1.     
21 The massive production of sulfa drugs by numerous manufacturers, coupled with a lack of testing requirements, 
resulted in the 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster, where upwards of 100 people were poisoned by certain 
manufactures of the drug.  This tragedy helped fuel public outcry that led to the passage of the Federal Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act of 1938.  See Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir 
Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE (June 1981), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/SulfanilamideDisaster/default.htm.  For 
accounts of the crisis written in 1937, see Medicine: Post-Mortem, TIME, Dec. 20, 1937, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,758704,00.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2011); Death Drug' Hunt 
Covered 15 States; Wallace Reveals How Federal Agents Traced Elixir To Halt Fatalities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 
1937, available at 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C15F93B59177A93C4AB178AD95F438385F9 (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2011).     
22 This paper does not address the important issue of reducing antibiotic usage in animals.  See Kades, supra note 2, 
at 618 n.36-39 and accompanying text for further discussion on the topic.  
23 The relevant time span for this estimate is from 1933 to 1955.  David Schlessinger, Biological Basis for 
Antibacterial Action, in MECHANISMS OF MICROBIAL DISEASE 78 (Moselio Schaechter et. al. eds., 1993), quoted in 
Kades, supra note 2, at 615. 6 
 
Bacteria, however, began showing signs of resistance early on.
24  Antibiotic resistance is 
a natural evolutionary consequence to antibiotic exposure, whereby bacteria genetically adapt to 
become less susceptible to the antimicrobial agent in use.
25  One commentator attributes the 
adaptability of bacterial populations to their “genetic plasticity” and “rapid replication” rates, 
noting that “it takes many bacteria only 20-30 min[utes] to replicate.”
26  Because of their quick 
rate of reproduction, bacteria that develop genetic characteristics that render them invulnerable to 
a certain antibiotic can survive and quickly generate new populations carrying these resistant 
characteristics.  Thus, the more a strain of bacteria is exposed to an antibiotic, the more likely it 
is to both develop and spread resistance to that antibiotic.
27   
A consequence of bacterial resistance is that antibiotics have a finite shelf-life.  Antibiotic 
drugs present a unique challenge precisely because their absolute effectiveness decreases over 
time, not merely their relative effectiveness as compared to competing drugs on the market.
28  
Commentators often refer to antibiotics as an exhaustible resource,
29 or a common pool 
resource,
30 “prone to depletion and collapse through uncoordinated withdrawals.”
31  As seen 
through this framework, uncoordinated withdrawals include our overuse and misuse of 
                                                 
24 As noted earlier, bacteria began showing resistance to penicillin within ten years of the drug’s introduction.  See 
Cars & Nordberg, supra note 3, at 1. 
25 See generally Kades, supra note 2, at 617-25; Spellberg et. al., A Call to Action, supra note 1, at 2; I.M. Gould, 
Antibiotic Resistance: The Perfect Storm, 34 INT’L J. ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS S2, S3 (2009) (“Whether it be a 
resistant Gram-positive or Gram-negative organism that is causing a therapeutic problem, one of the most likely 
causes is prior exposure of that patient to one or more broad-spectrum antibiotics.”).  
26 Spellberg et. al., A Call to Action, supra note 1, at 155-56 (“There is no doubt that microbes are the most 
numerous, diverse, and adaptable organisms that have ever lived on the planet.”); see also MacDougall & Polk, 
supra note 4, at 638 (“This [microorganisms’ ability to rapidly develop resistance to antimicrobials] is a testament to 
the impressive reproductive rate of most microorganisms, the tremendous selective pressure that antimicrobial 
agents apply to these populations, and the huge number of unculturable organisms in the environment that may be 
serving as reservoirs of antimicrobial resistance genes.”).  
27 See generally RAMANAN LAXMINARAYAN ET. AL., EXTENDING THE CURE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE GROWING 
THREAT OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 3-4 (2007) [hereinafter EXTENDING THE CURE]; Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, 
at 787-90; Spellberg et. al., A Call to Action, supra note 1, at 156-57.  
28 Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 31 CARD. L. REV. 613, 637 (2010) [hereinafter Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance]. 
29 Kades, supra note 2, at 629. 
30 Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 614. 
31 Id.  Typical examples of common pool resources include fisheries and forests.  See id.  7 
 
antibiotics, which threaten to “prematurely destroy these important drugs.”
32  Approaching 
antibiotic resistance as a resource issue serves not only a helpful explanatory function, but it also 
helps shape the prescriptive debate by focusing on which solutions will be most effective at the 
patient level, facility level, and ecological level.
33   
II.  CONSERVATION AS AN APPROACH TO RESISTANCE 
Resistance may not be preventable by human efforts – but it can be slowed.  By reducing 
the “selective pressure” we put on bacteria “via exposure to the thousands of metric tons of 
antibiotics we have used...over the past half century,”
34 we can prolong the absolute usefulness 
of these drugs.  It seems, though, that these years of overuse and misuse have taken their toll on 
antibiotic effectiveness and have contributed what the medical community considers to be 
alarming rate of resistance to certain drugs.
35     
A number of studies demonstrate the increased speed at which bacteria have been 
developing resistance.  Two such studies described by Laxminarayan et. al. acutely illustrate the 
phenomenon.  In 1987, only 2% of patients infected with Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus or, 
more colloquially, “staph”) showed resistance to methicillin, an antibiotic that had been on the 
market since the 1960s and was largely an effective treatment.  By 2004, more than 50% of 
                                                 
32 Id.  Overuse refers to the unnecessary use of powerful antibiotics to treat minor or routine organisms.  See Sage & 
Hyman, supra note 1, at 791.  Misuse refers to the inappropriate usage of antibiotics.  Examples of antibiotic misuse 
include: (1) the common problem of prescribing antibiotics for a viral infection, against which antibiotics are 
completely ineffective; (2) prescribing the wrong antibiotic for the bacteria at issue; and (3) prescribing the right 
antibiotic, but in a sub-therapeutic dose.  See id; see also Ethan Rubinstein & George G. Zhanel, The Hospital 
Physician, Anti-Infective Research and Development – Problems, Challenges, and Solutions, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 69, 70 (2007) (noting the near 40% inappropriate use of antibiotics in hospital settings). 
33 See MacDougall & Polk, supra note 4, at 639 (discussing the need to have the requisite understanding of the 
interaction between antibiotic use and antibiotic resistance at the various levels).  
34 Spellberg et. al., A Call to Action, supra note 1, at 157.   
35 BAD BUGS, supra note 11, at 9 (“‘Antibiotic resistance is increasing too quickly and in too many organisms...’”); 
see also George H. Talbot et. al., Bad Bugs Need Drugs: An Update on the Development Pipeline from the 
Antimicrobial Availability Task Force of the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 657, 657 (2006) (noting “an increasing frequency and severity of antimicrobial resistance”).   8 
 
patients infected with S. aureus did not respond to methicillin.
36  This particular pathogen – 
methicillin-resistant S. aureus (or MRSA) – causes many types of serious infections and can 
have fatal consequences if untreated.
37  MRSA strains are resistant not only to methicillin but to 
other classes of antibiotics as well.
38  Discouragingly, doctors have begun to report cases of 
MRSA that fail to respond to vancomycin, the antibiotic to which doctors most frequently resort 
in order to treat MRSA infections.
39  Another such study focuses on Streptococcus pneumoniae 
(S. pneumoniae), a bacteria which can cause bacterial meningitis as well as bacterial 
pneumonia.
40  In 1987, only .02% of patients infected with S. pneumonia did not respond to 
penicillin.  By 2004, this number had jumped to a staggering 20%, representing a 1,000-fold 
increase in less than twenty years.
41  Additional pathogens that have exhibited dangerous forms 
of resistance today have been identified as Acinetobacter baumannii; Aspergillus species; 
extended spectrum b-lactamase (ESBL)–producing Enterobacteriaceae; vancomycin-resistant 
Enterococcus faecium; and Pseudomonas aeruginosa.
42  
The growth of antibiotic-resistant bacteria implicates serious health concerns.  Infectious 
diseases already account for the third-leading cause of death in the United States,
43 and the 
second-leading cause of death in the world,
44 a figure that is likely to increase as resistant 
                                                 
36 EXTENDING THE CURE, supra note 27, at 1. 
37 See generally Talbot et. al., supra note 35, at 665.  MRSA has become one of the more popularly recognized 
resistant pathogens, as it has spread from being a primarily hospital-acquired infection to one that is community-
acquired as well.  See id. 
38 See Kades, supra note 2, at 616 (noting that MRSA developed resistance to the antibiotic Cipro, which is in the 
fluoroquinolones class, after only three years).  A class of antibiotic refers to a group of drugs that exhibit the same 
“novel mechanisms of action” to fight bacteria.  COLSON, supra note 9, at 1. 
39 See id.; Talbot et. al., supra note 35, at 665.  
40 EXTENDING THE CURE, supra note 27, at 1.     
41 Id. 
42 See Talbot et. al., supra note 35, at 658-665, for further details about these specific pathogens. 
43 See Brad Spellberg et. al., Trends in Antimicrobial Drug Development: Implications for the Future, 38 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1279, 1279 (2004) [hereinafter Spellberg et. al., Trends].   
44 See id.   9 
 
bacteria become more prevalent.
45  Those infected with resistant bacteria experience a higher 
mortality rate and higher rates of secondary complications than those whose infections respond 
to antibiotics.
46  Moreover, the cost of treating antibiotic-resistant bacteria is much higher than 
treating antibiotic-susceptible bacteria, because the treatments are longer and more expensive.
47  
As such, concerned efforts to conserve antibiotic use are essential to mitigating the human and 
economic toll of antibiotic resistance.     
  Translating these observations, however, into targeted solutions aimed at an optimal 
rationalization of antibiotic use has proved to be difficult.  The main complicating factor is the 
fact that the empirical relationship between antibiotic use and antibiotic resistance is incredibly 
complex and not yet fully understood.
48  Some drugs remain effective against certain bacteria 
even after decades of use, but lose their effectiveness against other bacteria rather quickly.  For 
instance, the group A streptococci bacteria remain fully susceptible to penicillin, while more than 
90 percent of S. aureus strains and 30 percent of Streptococcus pneumonia strains are resistant to 
penicillin.
49  Likewise, even though a pathogen will often develop resistance to multiple drugs 
within the same class of antibiotics,
50 in some cases, a pathogen will develop resistance across 
                                                 
45 See Cars & Nordberg, supra note 3, at 1. 
46 See id. at 4; see also Rubinstein & Zhanel, supra note 34, at 69 (noting that drugs to treat resistant strains can be 
“hampered with adverse effects”). 
47 See BAD BUGS, supra note 11, at 3, 13; cf. Talbot et. al., supra note 35, at 658 (“[T]he toll of antimicrobial 
resistance: the loss of thousands of lives and the avoidable costs of billions of health care dollars.”). 
48 See Cars & Nordberg, supra note 3, at 3 (“The relationship between antibiotic use and resistance is complex.”); 
MacDougall & Polk, supra note 4, at 639 (describing studies that illustrate how the medical community’s 
understanding of the relationship between antibiotic use and resistance is incomplete). 
49 See Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 634 (quoting CDC’s Role in Monitoring and 
Preventing Antimicrobial Resistance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 
110th Cong. 2 (June 24, 2008)).  
50 As mentioned earlier, a class of antibiotics refers to a group of drugs that display the same distinct “mechanis[m] 
of action” against bacteria.  See COLSON, supra note 9, at 1; Outterson, Legal Ecology, supra note 28, at 634.   
 10 
 
multiple antibiotic classes.
51  Moreover, sometimes resistance can even be passed from one 
species of bacteria to another.
52   
The numerous ways in which resistance can develop makes it difficult to come up with a 
consistent antibiotic usage policy: strategies that may reduce resistance in some pathogens may 
be ineffective, or even counterproductive, in others.
53  Furthermore, even when efforts to reduce 
the usage of one antibiotic have been successful, that reduction is often merely substituted with 
the increased use of another antibiotic in its stead.  This is known as the “squeezing the balloon” 
phenomenon, which only results in “swapping one resistance problem for another.”
54  To avoid 
this fate, total reduction in antibiotic consumption must be part of any effective strategy for 
reducing resistance, rather than relying on piecemeal efforts of conservation which ultimately 
may not prove to be as fruitful.
55  In short, scientists are continually updating and revising their 
understanding of the biology of antibiotic resistance.
56  The policy implications of this are such 
that we need a response to antibiotic resistance that does not solely rely on altering antibiotic 
usage to reduce resistance outcomes.  Stated otherwise, until we have the knowledge to 
differentiate one pathogen’s reaction path from another, any policy that tries to modulate 
                                                 
51 Outterson, Legal Ecology, supra note 28, at 634. 
52 Id.; see also Kades, supra note 2, at 623 (“‘[A] single antibiotic to treat an infection can provoke resistance to 
other drugs...’”) (citation omitted).   
53 See Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 635 (noting how optimal dosing strategies depend 
on an accurate understanding of whether the  particular bacteria develops resistance through single-point mutations 
or through a more complex genetic process); Rubinstein & Zhanel, supra note 34, at 70 (“We also need to 
acknowledge that our understanding of when and how to best use combination antibiotic therapy is lacking.”).  
Compare Michael D. Tino, A Primary Care Physician, Anti-Infective Research and Development – Problems, 
Challenges, and Solutions, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 70, 71 (2007) (proposing new course of treatment for 
community based sinusitis and chronic bronchitis) with Glenn S. Tillotson, Bad Bugs Still Need Drugs, Anti-
Infective Research and Development – Problems, Challenges, and Solutions, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 76, 77 
(2007) (describing Dr. Tino’s approach, which suggests that “it might be beneficial to use more potent antimicrobial 
agents” to “eradicate a pathogen more efficiently” as a concept that has “yet to be more widely accepted”).    
54 Gould, supra note 25, at S4; see also MacDougall & Polk, supra note 4, at 647 (describing studies where reducing 
one antibiotic had the effect of reducing resistance in the targeted pathogen, but the subsequent increased usage of a 
replacement antibiotic was accompanied by the increased incidence of resistance in other pathogens). 
55 See Gould, supra note 25, at S4. 
56 MacDougall & Polk, supra note 4, at 639 (discussing the continuing evolving body of scientific knowledge about 
the relationship between antibiotic use and resistance). 11 
 
antibiotic usage will be suboptimal.  To be sure, antibiotic conservation is a necessary element to 
a resistance reduction strategy; it just should not be the only one.  This author submits that we 
cannot depend on a use-based conservation strategy to the exclusion of all others when (1) the 
marginal impact varies dramatically from one use to the other
57 and (2) we cannot adequately 
distinguish between the two in the ex-ante world.    
III.  CHALLENGES FACING THE ANTIBIOTIC MARKET 
A.  Declining Investments in Antibiotic Research and Development 
The rising rates of bacterial resistance, coupled with our incomplete understanding of the 
relationship between antibiotic use and resistance, necessitates a policy response that emphasizes 
the development of new drugs to target pathogens no longer susceptible to current treatments.
58  
In spite of this urgent need for novel therapies, the antibiotic pipeline is running dry.
59  Between 
1930 and 1970, scientists introduced fourteen different classes of antibiotics.
60  Since 1970, only 
five new classes have been discovered (mupirocins, streptogramins, oxazolidinones, 
lipopeptides, and pleuromutilins),
61 two of which (mupirocins and pleuromutilins) are only 
available for topical use.
62  The infectious disease community also warns of declines in four key 
measures of antibiotic innovation: the number of new drug applications,
63 the diversity in class 
among those drugs being developed,
64 the diversity in infections the drugs are indicated to treat, 
                                                 
57 See Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 634-5 (“Resistance within classes and between 
classes differs by both pathogen and drug...”) (citation omitted).  
58 See generally BAD BUGS, supra note 11, at 3.  
59 See id. at 14.  
60 COLSON, supra note 9, at 1.   
61 Id.  But see Kevin Outterson et. al., Will Longer Antimicrobial Patents Improve Global Public Health?, 7 LANCET 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 559, 559-61 (2007) (arguing that ketolides and glycylcyclines (introduced in 2004 and 2005, 
respectively) should be considered novel antimicrobial classes even though they are related to existing classes) 
[hereinafter Outterson et. al., Antimicrobial Patents].  
62 COLSON, supra note 9, at 1.  Topical antibiotics remain important for their ability to treat skin infections, 
especially those caused by MRSA.  Id. at 2. 
63 Id. at 1-2. 
64 Id. at 2 (noting that over seventy-five percent of new drug applications were in two classes).  12 
 
and the diversity in pathogens targeted by the drugs.
65  To be sure, there has been some recent 
progress in the development of drugs to treat infections due to MRSA, VRE (vancomycin-
resistant enterococci), and ESBL-producing bacteria (E. Coli and Klebsiella spp.), but the 
situation for infections caused by gram-negative bacteria such as Acinetobacter baumannii and 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, which often show immunity to all antibiotics currently on the market, 
remains much more grim.
66   
Although antibiotic research has not stopped, it has slowed and narrowed in scope.
67  
What accounts for this decline in clinical research and development efforts?  Commentators 
point to several contributing factors.   
Industry dynamics.  First, they note of the industry consolidation among the large 
pharmaceutical companies during the 1990s.  A product of this consolidation was the decline in 
the total number of companies engaged in antibiotic research, from seventy entities to fewer than 
twelve.
68      
Lower profitability profile.  Second, those remaining pharmaceutical companies began to 
leave the antibiotic space because it had become an unattractive market from a profitability 
standpoint relative to the markets for other drugs.
69  Even companies with well-known antibiotic 
programs, such as Roche, Abbott, and Eli Lilly, left the anti-infective market.
70  During the late 
1990s and early 2000s, “the number of established companies working on antibacterial products 
                                                 
65 Id.  
66 Id. For some positive news, Wyeth’s new drug tigecycline, introduced in 2005, is active against both gram-
positive and gram-negative bacteria.  Outterson et. al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 61, at 560.     
67 COLSON, supra note 9, at 3. 
68 See Jeffrey L. Fox, The Business of Developing Antibacterials, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1521, 1521 (2006); see also 
DAVID SHLAES, ANTIBIOTICS: THE PERFECT STORM 13 (2010).  
69 See generally BAD BUGS, supra note 11, at 14-19; Paul H. Rubin, The FDA’s Antibiotic Resistance, 27 REG. 34, 
34 (2005).  
70 Fox, supra note 68, at 1521. 13 
 
fell by about two-thirds, from at least 18 in the United States and Europe to only six.”
71  Why did 
we see such an exodus from the market?  The answer stems from the fact that antibiotics are a 
less attractive investment relative to other drugs, for several reasons.   
  One reason that antibiotics present a unique challenge to pharmaceutical companies is 
that, as noted above, their absolute effectiveness decreases over time, not simply their relative 
effectiveness vis-à-vis new competitors on the market.
72  This has the effect of reducing the 
overall value of the company’s investment in the antibiotic, because as the antibiotic becomes 
less effective, doctors will (presumably) prescribe it with less frequency, which in turn lowers 
revenue.  This is especially problematic when resistance to an antibiotic occurs within its patent 
period, as this is the time when pharmaceutical companies expect to reap most of their profits.
73   
To be sure, resistance is a double-edged sword when it comes to incentivizing antibiotic 
development.  On the one hand, resistance lowers the antibiotic’s net present value by 
diminishing the future stream of revenue, but, on the other the hand, resistance generates demand 
for novel antibiotics by creating bacteria that do not respond to current treatments.
74  Moreover, 
resistance has the added effect of continually clearing the competitive playing field of old 
antibiotics.
75  This is presumably a benefit for pharmaceutical companies, which would rather 
face less competition in the marketplace – as long, of course, as they are not the ones being 
swept away.  Kevin Outterson refers to these twin effects as part of his “resistance stimulates 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 See Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 637. 
73 Id. at 634; see also Schulman, supra note 14, at 234.  
74 See Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 630 (“Resistance also encourages the production of 
antibiotics with novel features.  Examples include new drug classes that bypass existing resistance mechanisms, 
such as ketolides, glyclycyclines, and some other antibiotics.”) (citations omitted).   
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To the extent that competition within existing drugs discourages market entry by a new drug, resistance clears the 
field and facilitates introduction of new drugs.”).  14 
 
innovation” hypothesis.
76  He makes the empirical argument that resistance does more to 
stimulate innovation than it does to discourage drug companies from entering the market, thus 
offering the conclusion that perhaps antibiotics need fewer financial incentives for development 
than other types of drugs.
77  Even if Outterson’s empirical claim is borne out, we are still left 
with the possibility that the future antibiotics may not be as effective as prior drugs,
78 that 
research and development efforts may not produce new drugs in time to meet patient needs, or 
that the pathogens displaying multi-drug resistance may constitute too small of a market to 
justify commercial expenditure.
79  Moreover, even if on balance resistance does more to spur 
innovation than to hinder it, it does not follow that resistance does enough to spur investment in 
antibiotics over investment in other classes of drugs that offer pharmaceutical companies a better 
return on investment (“ROI”).              
The major contributing factor to antibiotics’ relatively low ROI is the limited duration of 
antibiotic treatment.  Unlike medicines for chronic conditions (such as high blood pressure, 
cholesterol, or diabetes), which are taken regularly and over extended periods of time, antibiotics 
are taken only for a short length of time and only when an infection arises.
80  Pharmaceutical 
companies have accordingly weighted their research and development portfolios in favor of 
                                                 
76 Id. at 617.  He elaborates that there are three mechanisms by which resistance can spur innovation: (1) by 
“clearing out competitor drugs,” and (2) by “steering innovation towards novel classes.”  Id. at 636.  He argues that 
the innovation-generating effects of these two mechanisms outweigh the innovation-reducing effect of slowing 
down patent sales during the patent period due to increased resistance.  Id. at 637-41.       
77 Id. at 641. 
78 See Rubinstein & Zhanel, supra note 34, at 69 (discussing the lower health outcomes associated with newer 
antibiotics). 
79 See Talbot et. al., supra note 35, at 666 (“Unfortunately, many of the problem pathogens we have identified are 
characterized by commercial markets that are relatively small, as well as unpredictable; these factors have deterred 
major pharmaceutical companies from investing in these unmet needs.”).  
80 See generally David L. Pompliano, GSK – A Major Pharmaceutical Company, Anti-Infective Research and 
Development – Problems, Challenges, and Solutions, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 71, 71 (2007) (describing the 
“short-term use of nearly all antibiotics”).  15 
 
chronic and lifestyle drugs because they are the financial top performers.
81  For example, Pfizer’s 
Zithromax, one of the most profitable antibiotics while under patent, had only annual sales of $2 
billion, whereas Pfizer’s cholesterol drug Lipitor had annual sales of nearly $9 billion.
82  Eli 
Lilly’s most recent financial results are also telling: their top selling drugs consisted of 
treatments for mental health disorders (including depression), diabetes, osteoporosis, and 
lifestyle issues.
83  Eli Lilly no longer engages in antibiotic research. 
Antibiotic revenue streams are also likely to be lower because the drugs become less 
valuable as bacterial resistance grows.  Moreover, conservation efforts designed to reduce the 
usage of antibiotics have the added consequence of reducing the pharmaceutical companies’ 
incentives to invest in antibiotics in the first place.
84  This stems from the fact that conservation 
(and, for that matter, all efforts to reduce the incidence of infection) has the unavoidable effect of 
reducing the total amount of sales a drug company can expect to reap from their product.
85  This 
is especially so if the conservation efforts occur during the patent period, which is precisely 
when the medical community is more likely to conserve a novel therapy in order to preserve its 
                                                 
81 Spellberg et. al., Trends, supra note 43, at 1279.  The authors examined the publically disclosed descriptions of 
the research and development programs of the fifteen major pharmaceutical companies and the seven major 
biotechnology companies.  They discovered that out of a total of 315 new molecular entities (“NME”) undergoing 
development, only 5 (1.6%) of those could be classified as new antibacterial agents, whereas there were 67 (21%) 
NMEs related to cancer, 34 (10%) related to metabolic or endocrine diseases, and 33 (10%) related to inflammation 
or pain.  Id. at 1281-82.      
82 Rubin, supra note 69, at 34. 
83 Results are for the first quarter of 2011.  The following is a breakdown of their best selling drugs:  
1. Zyprexa, an anti-psychotic, with sales of $1.28 billion.   
2. Cymbalta, an antidepressant, with sales of $908.8 million  
3. Cialis, an erectile dysfunction treatment, with sales of $434.4 million 
4. Humulin, an insulin treatment, with sales of $289.8 million 
5. Evista, an osteoporosis treatment, with sales of $266.1 million 
6. Forteo, an osteoporosis treatment, with sales of $216.1 million  
Drugmaker Eli Lilly’s 1Q Sales Growth at a Glance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/04/18/business/AP-US-Earns-Eli-Lilly-Glance.html?_r=1&hp (last visited 
April 18, 2011). 
84 See generally Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 642.   
85 See id.; Rubin, supra note 69, at 34 (“As usage is reduced to eliminate resistance, sales are also reduced, and 
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effectiveness.
86  Kevin Outterson refers to this phenomenon as the “conservation dampens 
production” hypothesis, explaining that conservation works “at cross-purposes with incentives to 
produce novel antibiotics.”
87  Of course, this hypothesis might not pose such a problem, as the 
end goal is better health outcomes, not just pharmaceutical innovation for its own sake.
88  If 
conservation alone were sufficient to solve the resistance problem, we could thus tolerate the 
resulting dampened incentives for antibiotic innovation.  As discussed above in Part II, however, 
we cannot rely solely on demand-side conservation.  We must also encourage supply-side 
research and development of new anti-infective drugs to augment the cache of antibiotic 
treatments as a critical component to a successful resistance strategy.  Thus, unlike Kevin 
Outterson’s proposition that antibiotics require fewer financial incentives than other drugs, I 
would argue that they need even more because of the effects of conservation initiatives on 
market demand.            
Diminishing returns to research and development.  Third, there is worry that the “low-
hanging” fruit of antibiotic research have already been plucked, making the discovery of novel 
antibiotic drugs an even more difficult achievement.
89  Scientists have traditionally uncovered 
new antibiotics by evaluating natural products, like Alexander Fleming’s broad mold, for their 
                                                 
86 See Pompliano, supra note 80, at 71(noting that one of the aspects detracting from the commercial returns of 
antibiotics is the increasing “tendency by physicians to refrain from prescribing new antibiotics so as to keep them 
in reserve until older drugs fail.”); cf. Tillotson, supra note 53, at 74 (“[F]ew practitioners are confident in using the 
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87 Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 642.  He further elaborates: “Antibiotic stewardship and 
rational use programs can be considered anti-marketing campaigns.  Infection control efforts, if successful, reduce 
the spread of dangerous infections and reduce the need for antibiotic treatments.”  Id.  
88 See id. at 643 (“Remember that the goal is continued antibiotic effectiveness, not new drugs per se.  If patients 
receive effective treatment, or better yet, avoid infection in the first place, then the social welfare goals have been 
met.”).  
89 See id. at 644; cf. SHLAES, supra note 68, at 13 (“Our ability to discover new antibiotics is restrained by the more 
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inherent antibacterial properties and chemically modifying promising candidate molecules.
90  
This natural products approach has been yielding fewer successes, however, which prompted 
scientists to turn their attention (and hopes) to high-technology approaches such as genomics and 
bioinformatics to help uncover new antibacterial targets.
91   Unfortunately, the medical 
community has been disappointed by the results.
92  One Glaxo-Smith-Kline researcher noted: 
A decade ago, the hope was that genomics would provide for drug discovery a 
trove of broadly useful bacterial targets.  Although genomics has greatly informed 
bacterial pylogeny and physiology, it has not yet led to a marketed antibiotic.  Nor 
has automated screening of bacterial targets against vast chemical libraries met 
early expectations: the ‘hit’ rate in these screens has been lower in than in  
therapeutic classes....
93 
 
The failure of these high technology approaches has led researchers to return to the more 
“traditional” methods of antibiotic research, but there is a remaining concern that the new drugs 
may not be as good as the old ones.
94  Even though they may be effective against certain 
bacteria, “most new antibiotics carry serious side effect risks, including adverse reactions, liver 
toxicity, and other serious risks of organ failure.”
95  For example, vancomycin, the drug most 
often used to treat MRSA, carries with it the limitations of poor tissue penetration and the risks 
of potential liver toxicity.
96  If pharmaceutical companies take the view of those researchers who 
believe that “we have already harvested the low-hanging fruit of easily discoverable 
antibiotics,”
97 or, even more dismally, those researchers who believe that “the number of 
                                                 
90 See Fox, supra note 68, at 1526; Schulman, supra note 14, at 225 (“Many successful antibiotics were discovered 
by observing how other organisms, such as fungi, inhibit the growth of bacteria.”). 
91 See Fox, supra note 68, at 1526. 
92 Id. 
93 Pompliano, supra note 80, at 72. 
94 See Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 643-45 (“If a new drug is not better and entails 
unknown safety risks, then innovation results in an even greater social welfare loss.”)  
95 Id. at 644. 
96 Id. at 644 n.149. 
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possible antibiotic targets is finite,”
98 then without additional incentives, these companies will 
abandon their antibiotic programs under the belief that such investments will only yield 
progressively diminished returns.
99        
Institutional competence favoring large pharmaceutical companies over small 
biotechnology companies.  Fourth, while large pharmaceutical companies have been shedding 
their antibiotic research and development programs, we have seen an influx of smaller 
pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology companies enter the space.
100  This trend is in 
large part a product of the industry consolidation itself, as larger pharmaceutical companies 
began to (1) spin-off small groups to focus exclusively on anti-infectives
101 and (2) to sell off the 
chemical compounds in their antibiotic portfolio in an effort to wind down their investments.  
Indeed, “there is a small window during which discarded discovery research programs may be 
continued in meaningful new products.”
102   
The story of Cubist Pharmaceutical’s daptomycin offers one such glimpse into what a 
successful transition of a compound from a large pharmaceutical company to a smaller biotech 
looks like.
103  In 2003, Cubist received approval in the United States for daptomycin (brand 
                                                 
98 Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 18, at 77. 
99 Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 644-45. 
100 See Fox, supra note 68, at 1521 (“[T]here are signs of renewed energy and progress, much of it emanating from 
an odd assortment of several dozen biotech companies, many of them in the United States but also in Europe and 
Asia.”); Frank Tally & Praveen Tipirneni, Cubist – A Small Pharmaceutical Company Focusing on Hospital 
Infections, Anti-Infective Research and Development – Problems, Challenges, and Solutions, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 72, 72 (2007). 
101 See Tillotson, supra note 53, at 77.  Examples of this include Roche’s offshoot Basilea Pharmaceutica (Basel), 
Sanofi-Aventis’ 2004 spinout of Novexel, and Peninsula’s spinoff of Cerexa.  Fox, supra note 68, at 1524.  To be 
sure, those large pharmaceutical companies that remained in the antibiotic space tended to acquire smaller 
pharmaceutical companies whose pipelines looked promising, including Pfizer’s acquisition of Vicuron 
Pharmaceuticals in 2005 for $1.9 billion, and Johnson & Johnson’s acquisition of Peninsula Pharmaceuticals for 
$245 million.  See Fox, supra note 68, at 1524.     
102 Roger Echols, The Biotech Company View, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1519, 1519 (2006). 
103 Cubist Pharmaceuticals, Inc. employs more than 600 people and had 2010 net revenues of $636.4 million.  See 
Cubist Pharmaceuticals, About Cubist, http://cubist.com/about/.  By contrast, Eli Lilly is the tenth largest 
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name Cubicin), the first antibiotic in the new class of lipopetides.
104  Daptomycin is active 
against MRSA as well as other types of gram-positive bacteria, though it requires intravenous 
treatment.
105  As a testament to the drug’s success, Cubist reported that daptomycin “has had the 
fastest and most impressive sales growth of any intravenous launched in recent history.”
106  
Daptomycin, however, was initially discovered by Eli Lilly, which eventually discontinued its 
work on the compound in 1991 due to its high levels of toxicity.
107  Cubist then in-licensed the 
compound in 1997, with the view towards meeting the demand for an antibiotic other than 
vancomycin that could treat those patients infected with MRSA.
108  Cubist spent the next several 
years re-developing the drug to solve the dosing and toxicity issues and putting it through 
clinical trials, eventually working cooperatively with the FDA to get the drug approved.
109  
Those who look to small pharmaceuticals to fill the gap left by “big pharma” in the antibiotic 
space point to this example as illustrative of how “small pharmaceutical companies can take a 
nascent product from early development through to commercialization.”
110   
There are some in the medical community, however, who are concerned about the ability 
of small pharmaceuticals and biotechnology companies to take over where large pharmaceutical 
companies left off.  First, they note that antibiotic development has mainly been the work of “big 
pharma.”  As such, the research and development programs of the world’s fifteen largest 
pharmaceutical companies account for 93% of the antibiotics approved by the FDA from 1980 to 
                                                 
104 See Tally & Tipirneni, supra note 100, at 72. 
105 Id. 
106 Outterson et. al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 61, at 560. 
107 Tally & Tipirneni, supra note 100, at 72. 
108 Id. at 72-73.  
109 Id. at 73.  The solution to daptomycin’s toxicity problems lay in changing the drug to a once-daily dosing, a 
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2003.
111  Even now, the smaller biotech companies have been able to enter the space because 
they could in-license compounds that were discovered yet discarded by the large pharmaceutical 
programs.  Critics remain skeptical that these small companies can independently discover novel 
therapies when the current pipeline of abandoned compounds runs dry.
112  These worries are 
driven in part by the immense amount of capital required to discover novel antibacterial 
molecules,
113 let alone the capital required to undergo clinical testing necessary for approval.  
The high cost of testing and marketing explains why, traditionally, biotech companies have 
handed off promising medical compounds to large pharmaceutical companies to pay for the 
clinical testing and marketing phase of the drug’s development.  What we are seeing now is the 
reverse of this trend, whereby smaller companies have taken over the drug at the end of 
development and into the testing phase.
114   
To that end, the circumstances of the daptomycin transition were such that Cubist needed 
relatively low capital outlays for the drug’s testing and marketing.  Because daptomycin was an 
intravenous antibiotic, it could only be administered in a hospital setting, and “[t]ypically, trial 
sizes [for acute indications in a hospital setting] are smaller than those in an outpatient setting, in 
the range of several thousand patients.”
115  Comparatively, for a broad-spectrum drug available 
on an out-patient basis (e.g., pill form), “much larger trials and safety databases are necessary; it 
is much more difficult for small companies to afford and to implement such operations.”
116  The 
hospital-setting indication also helped Cubist save on marketing costs, because “the prescribing 
                                                 
111 See Spellberg et. al., Trends, supra note 43, at 1281. 
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113 See Fox, supra note 68, at 1526. 
114 See Joseph Gottfried, History Repeating? Avoiding a Return to the Pre-Antibiotic Age 49 (2005), in Peter Barton 
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bodies in hospitals can be targeted in a much more specific way than practitioners in the 
community, meaning that a large and expensive marketing team is not necessary.”
117  Thus, it 
seems that antibiotics for hospital-based acute infections may be well-suited to the small 
pharmaceutical or the biotechnology company cost structure.
118  We will not, however, be able to 
solely rely on niche antibiotics to overcome the resistance problem and sustain society’s 
innovation needs, especially when those antibiotics are only available in a hospital setting.  The 
medical community acknowledges the need for more broad-spectrum antibiotics and antibiotics 
available in an oral formulation, precisely those drugs that are better suited for the R&D 
programs of a large scale pharmaceutical company.
119  
B.  Antibiotic Market Externalities 
  The growing problem of antibiotic resistance is also exacerbated by certain externalities 
associated with antibiotic usage.  According to Paul Rubin, “an externality is said to exist when 
one person’s behavior has effects – positive or negative – on another person and those effects are 
not priced into the market.”
120  Because of this mispricing of the activity, “externalities lead to 
non-optimal behavior.”
121  If an activity is associated with a positive externality, then “private 
agents will not do enough of the activity because an agent does not obtain all the benefits of the 
action.”
122  Conversely, if an activity is associated with a negative externality, then private agents 
will engage in too much of the activity because they are not forced to bear the entire cost of the 
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118 See Fox, supra note 68, at 1525 (“Clinical and commercial success with a drug that targets a single pathogen 
‘would reopen a lot of rooms worth revisiting with target-based approaches and might be very attractive for smaller 
companies,’....‘There are a lot of challenges, including the need for a clean safety profile....But if successful, it 
would open a new world.’”).  
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action.
123  Antibiotics face certain notable externalities, suggesting that their current market 
pricing is not accurately reflective of the true cost of antibiotic use.     
  Public health externality (positive). The most traditional reason to encourage antibiotic 
usage is that public health is improved as more people take antibiotics to cure their infections.  
Because one person’s taking an antibiotic also prevents someone else from contracting the same 
infection, the public benefits from that person’s usage.
124  In this way, the market price of 
antibiotics can be considered too expensive, because it does not take into account the public 
health benefits arising out of an individual dosage.  Thus, this account would lead us to subsidize 
antibiotic usage to adequately price in the public benefit.  Efforts to encourage antibiotic usage 
may take the shape of expanding access to antibacterial drugs, especially to poorer populations; 
educating patients of the importance of finishing the schedule of treatment; and prescribing 
broad-spectrum antibiotics “to enhance the likelihood of therapeutic success.”
125   As Paul Rubin 
notes, the public health externality “is the ultimate theoretical reason for public health 
interventions and for the existence of the CDC.”
126  
  Conservation externality (negative).  As discussed more thoroughly above, as antibiotics 
are conserved and thus used less frequently, the incentives for antibiotic development diminish in 
turn as expected profitability is reduced.
127  However, conservation is designed to prevent the 
largest externality of antibiotic usage – antibiotic resistance.     
  Resistance externality (negative).  Antibiotic resistance is the most threatening externality 
of antibiotic usage.  As antibiotic usage increases, the exposure to the antibiotic puts pressure on 
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bacteria to develop resistance.  This suggests that antibiotics are in fact too cheap, as the current 
pricing does not take into account the true cost of antibiotic usage.  The under-pricing of 
antibiotics is consistent with the account that antibiotics are grossly overused and misused;
128 
neither patients nor their doctors have to pay for the resistance externalities imposed on others, 
so they are not incentivized to invest in proper information-gathering at the prescription stage.  
Such information-gathering would include patient education as well as incentives for developing 
and using diagnostic tests to determine whether a patient’s infection is bacterial or viral in 
nature.
129  This would work towards curbing the misuse of antibiotics, as nearly 40% of 
antibiotic consumption in the community “is considered based on incorrect indications, mostly 
viral infections”
130  Similarly, sensitivity testing could be used to determine whether the patient 
can be given “narrow-spectrum or weaker drugs” as opposed to the powerful broad-spectrum 
antibiotics, which are associated with a higher resistance externality.
131   
  Currently, these sorts of tests only impose costs on the patient, both in the form of 
delayed care and added expense; the patient is not rewarded for undertaking this initial 
assessment.
132  If the use of antibiotics were accurately priced to take into account the potential 
resistance effects, however, then individuals would be discouraged from inappropriate overuse of 
antibiotics, and cost-benefit analysis would incentivize them to spend more resources in pre-
prescription research.
133   
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  Admittedly, there are many practical limitations to this line of reasoning.  First, the task 
of accurately pricing in the externality effect of antibiotic resistance would be a challenge in 
itself.
134  A second complicating factor is the tension between the individual and community 
interest within the resistance externality.  There are times when the two are aligned: when an 
individual takes an antibiotic, that person risks having some bacteria in his own body develop 
resistance to that drug, such that it will become “more difficult for [him] to overcome future 
infections.”
135  This private cost is aligned with the cost to the community of that person 
spreading the resistant bacteria to others.  However, there are times when the interests diverge: 
when “a strong antibiotic may indeed be preferable for the treatment of each particular infected 
patient, even if it results in adverse consequences for future patients.”
136  These cases require us 
to weigh the health interests of the individual against the health interests of society, a task that 
implicates a larger normative debate about the primacy of liberty versus community interests in 
medical decision-making.  As William Sage and David Hyman explain, “liberty is one of the 
founding principles of the United States, and it has independent ethical and constitutional 
importance.”
137  A government measure that would subordinate the interest of the individual in 
receiving the antibiotic to the interests of the community in preserving antibiotic effectiveness 
would be viewed as a terrible “incursion on liberty” by such supporters.  The same measure 
would more likely “resonate with supporters of communitarian conceptions of government, who 
                                                                                                                                                            
tests to determine if an infection is bacterial, and if so, whether the bug is resistant to any antibiotics.”).  Kades notes 
that while there are some “new [diagnostic] tests on the horizon that yield results much more rapidly,” “such 
progress...appears to be the exception rather than the rule.”  Id. at 639.     
134 See id. at 627 (discussing problems of remedying externalities associated with antibiotic use). 
135 Rubin, supra note 69, at 35 (though, Rubin characterizes this as a private cost, not an externality). 
136 Sage and Hyman, supra note 1, at 791-92. 
137 Id. at 796. 25 
 
view the proper regulation of common resource pools as a politically important commitment, as 
well as one that produces a long-term efficiency gain.”
138  
  Balancing Act.  The public health externality and the resistance externality are squarely at 
odds with each other.  The former suggests that antibiotics should be subsidized, while the latter 
suggests that antibiotics should be taxed.
139  To reconcile these competing propositions, we 
would have to undertake a comprehensive netting analysis to determine which externality effect 
is more powerful, and by how much.  It seems, though, that an effective antibiotic usage policy 
need not be so unvarying that it could not distinguish between circumstances where different 
externalities may dominate.  For example, there may be some situations in which the immediate 
public health externality outweighs a future resistance externality.
140  It thus seems that an 
optimal antibiotic usage policy would want to encourage the drug’s use in cases where the public 
health benefits are high and the resistance externalities are low and, conversely, to discourage 
use when the resistance externalities are high and the public health externalities are low (such as 
when the patient has a virus, not a bacterial infection).
141  I submit that there are ways to 
distinguish between these circumstances and tailor the market prices accordingly.
142   
  Antibiotic usage, however, constitutes only a portion of the larger policy question 
concerning antibiotic resistance.  It would thus be a mistake to conflate the externality discussion 
with the decline in research and development discussion: externalities suggest that consumers are 
                                                 
138 Id. 
139 I use the word “tax” not in the formal sense of the term, but only to suggest that the prevailing market price of 
antibiotics is too low and should be increased in order to take into account the effects of the negative resistance 
externality.  Imposing a tax is one classic way to address activities associated with negative externalities.  See 
Kades, supra note 2, at 638 (discussing Pigovian taxation in the context of antibiotics).  
140 Such an example might occur when there is high potential for an infectious disease outbreak and the risk of 
resistance is low.   
141 See Kades, supra note 2, at 628 (“[A]ny solution must somehow discourage some present low-value use to 
preserve the potency of antibiotics for future high-value use.”). 
142 See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text for a discussion on price discrimination as a method to tailor 
market prices.  26 
 
being mispriced in the market, while the R&D question suggests that pharmaceutical companies 
lack the financial incentives to invest in antibiotic programs at a socially optimal level.  Both 
explain why we have suboptimal outcomes in the antibiotic market, but each has a different 
temporal focus.  The R&D issue concerns the suboptimal incentives for the producer, while the 
externality issue concerns the suboptimal incentives for the patient-user.  While these two 
questions are obviously related, they require distinct policy treatment.
143  Many scholars 
advocate that a comprehensive antibiotic policy should “disassociate” the financial incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to engage in research and development from the market signals 
conveyed to consumers.
144  In agreement, this paper argues that antibiotic resistance should be 
addressed by separately considering the financial incentives to engage in antibiotic innovation 
from the market-based incentives to prescribe or consume antibiotics.       
IV.  SHAPING AN EFFECTIVE ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE POLICY 
Developing an effective antibiotic resistance policy is complicated because many of the 
policy levers to achieve this goal work at cross purposes.  Conservation is necessary to reduce 
resistance, but conservation also reduces the incentives to engage in antibiotic innovation by 
lowering the net present value of the market.  Moreover, the more we prolong the effectiveness 
of one antibiotic, the less we incentivize pharmaceutical companies to develop replacement 
drugs.
145  In a perfect market, resistance, conservation and innovation would all exist in 
equilibrium, and we would continually have a sufficient supply of new antibiotics to treat 
                                                 
143 They are related in the sense that a pharmaceutical company’s decision to enter the antibiotic space will depend 
on the demand they expect from consumers (i.e., patients and doctors).  
144 See Amy Kapczynski, Commentary: Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264, 265 (2009); 
James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV., 
1519, 1528 (2007) (in the context of advocating a prize-based system to stimulate investments rather than a patent-
based system).    
145 See Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 642-43.  27 
 
pathogens that developed resistance to older drugs.  This is not, unfortunately, an accurate 
description of our current world.   
In order to overcome the problem of antibiotic resistance, we need both conservation and 
innovation.  The debate right now seems to take a “winner takes all approach,” with one side 
arguing that because innovation has not worked, we need to emphasize conservation, and the 
other side arguing the reverse.
146  This paper argues that both conservation and innovation are 
necessary to deal with the growing rate of antibiotic resistance; and, if conservation has the effect 
of reducing incentives to innovate, then we need to compensate for that reduction and incentivize 
pharmaceutical companies even more than we would have without that dampening effect.  The 
remainder of this section reviews the current policy options to achieve the twin goals of 
encouraging antibiotic innovation and discouraging inappropriate antibiotic usage and suggests 
those that appear most promising.     
A.  Developing Incentives for Optimal Antibiotic Innovation 
Traditionally, the government has employed intellectual property law to stimulate the 
research and development of new drugs through the patent system, which grants pharmaceutical 
companies a temporary monopoly over their discovery through exclusive marketing rights.
147         
Many scholars recognize that the current patent system is not sufficiently promoting optimal 
levels of investment in antibiotic research and development programs, but they vary dramatically 
                                                 
146 Compare Gould, supra note 25, at S4 (arguing that because financial incentives have not yet worked, “we have 
no alternative but to use antibiotics more wisely”) and Spellberg, Antibiotic Resistance and Antibiotic Development, 
8 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 211, 211 (2008) (arguing that certain other authors “favor antibiotic preservation 
efforts in lieu of creating incentives for antibiotic development.”) with Kades, supra note 2, at 661 (“[I]t appears that 
the only way to ‘escape’ from the exhaustibility of antibiotics is to invent new ones continually.”).  
147 As Kades notes, “[t]he usual justification for rewarding inventors with monopoly rights, called patents, is ‘a 
practical utilitarianism: reward the creator of a useful thing, and society will get more useful things...this mode of 
thought...is the core of all patent systems.’” Kades, supra note 2, at 644 (quoting ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. 
DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES & MATERIALS 2 (3d ed. 2002)).  28 
 
in terms of their suggested approaches.
148  The main debate is between those who advocate for 
increased patent protection to stimulate antibiotic innovation and those who advocate for 
abandoning the patent system entirely in favor of a cash-based prize system.
149   
Wild Card Patent Extensions.  Those scholars who favor continued reliance on the patent 
system to increase innovation incentives often support the use of wild-card patent extensions to 
spur research and development.  A wild-card patent extension “is the name commonly attributed 
to the idea that a pharmaceutical company that introduces a new and effective antibiotic on the 
market should be allowed to get an extension on its patent-rights for one of its other products.”
150  
The IDSA recommended that Congress enact legislation to establish such a system, whereby any 
pharmaceutical company that receives FDA approval for an antibiotic that targets a high priority 
pathogen receive a patent extension of six months to two years on any drug that it sells.
151  
Supporters of this idea argue that it will provide the necessary incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to engage in antibiotic research programs because it dramatically 
increases the profitability of developing a successful antibiotic, and it does so through the market 
without “requiring upfront public financing.”
152  They also argue that despite the increased costs 
                                                 
148 The range of measures designed to make antibiotic R&D more attractive to pharmaceutical companies include 
“wildcard patent extensions, patent extensions, advance-market commitments, cash prizes, increased funding for 
public antimicrobial research and various sorts of tax credits....” Jorn Sonderholm, Wild-Card Patent Extensions as 
a Means to Incentive Research and Development of Antibiotics, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 240, 240 (2009).     
149 Compare id. at 241-44 and Spellberg et. al., Societal Costs versus Savings from Wild-Card Patent Extension 
Legislation to Spur Critically Needed Antibiotic Development, 35 INFECTION 167, 171-72 (2007) [hereinafter 
Spellberg et. al., Societal Costs versus Savings] (both advocating for wild-card patent extensions) with Kapczynski, 
supra note 144 and Outterson et. al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 61, at 562 (both rejecting wild-card patents 
as an effective way to incentivize R&D).  
150 Sonderholm, supra note 148, at 241. 
151 BAD BUGS, supra note 11, at 24; see also Spellberg et. al., Societal Costs versus Savings, supra note 149, at 167-
68.  Some scholars even advocate for a system of tradable wild-card extensions, such that a pharmaceutical company 
that develops an antibiotic targeting a high priority pathogen could sell its wild-card patent extension to another firm 
with a more profitable drug on the market.  Through this system, all pharmaceutical companies would be 
incentivized to engage in antibiotic research, not just those companies that have a current blockbuster drug on the 
market.  See Sonderholm, supra note 148, at 241.  
152 Sonderholm, supra note 148, at 241.  For example, a six-month extension of Pfizer’s blockbuster drug Lipitor 
would have resulted in protected sales of an additional $3.1 billion if sales remained constant throughout the patent 
period.  Id.  Lipitor’s patent expired in 2010.  Id.   29 
 
that would result from a patent extension on a top-selling drug, the wild-card patent system 
would ultimately be a cost-effective measure once the savings from the costs associated with 
resistant infections are taken into account.
153   
In contrast, wild-card detractors take issue with many of these arguments, questioning 
“the fairness, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of wildcard patents and patent extensions.”
154  
They argue that the costs of a wild-card system would be staggering.  For example, Kevin 
Outterson suggests that implementing a wild-card patent scheme would “require spending in the 
range of $8.7 billion to $11.9 billion per delivered antimicrobial drug, greatly exceeding the 
industry’s [current] estimates of $800 million per new molecule by an order of magnitude.”
155 
They argue that these funds could be better deployed in other ways to help address the resistance 
problem.
156  This concern for the efficiency of the wild-card patent system is grounded in a 
larger concern for the efficiency of the patent system in general to stimulate optimal levels of 
research and development.  As James Love and Tim Hubbard ask: “[H]ow much R&D do we get 
for the [patent] price premium?”
157  They go on to estimate that “[c]onsumers pay eight or nine 
dollars in higher prices to stimulate one dollar in R&D spending,” arguing that “the patent 
system (as currently implemented) is a very expensive way to stimulate R&D.”
158  Further 
perpetuating this patent system would only serve to continue the inefficient incentivizing of 
research programs, and it would unfairly do so at the expense of those patients who are in need 
of the blockbuster drug that would now continue to sell at monopoly prices via the wild-card 
                                                 
153 See Spellberg et. al., Societal Costs versus Savings, supra note 149, at 170 (arguing that a wild-card patent 
extension program would take 10 years after approval of a qualifying antibiotic to become cost-neutral).    
154 Kevin Outterson, Author’s Reply, 8 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 212, 212 (2008) [hereinafter Outterson, 
Reply]. 
155 Outterson et. al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 61, at 561. 
156 Outterson, Reply, supra note 154, at 212-13. 
157 Love & Hubbard, supra note 144, at 1523. 
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extension.
159  Perhaps more fundamentally, those who reject the use of wild-card patents argue 
that the system is not necessarily a logical one.  To that end, Amy Kapczynski notes that wild-
card patent supporters do not provide a rational explanation as to why the “right measure of 
reward” for antibiotic innovation is “the market for a term extension for Lipitor,” “rather than, 
for example, the market for a term extension for a software patent or a copyright in a film[.]”
160  
Rather, these scholars advocate approaches that are more transparent and linked to antibiotic 
demand itself, either through direct financing from the government,
161 prize systems,
162 or 
through raising the prices of antibiotics themselves.
163   
  Patent Extensions.  Another patent-related proposal to incentivize antibiotic research and 
development is to extend the patent life of a qualifying antimicrobial drug.
164  Patent extensions 
of this sort are already available for pediatric drugs and orphan drugs.
165  For example, the Best 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act
166 provides an additional six months of market exclusivity for 
qualifying drugs, along with priority review status with the FDA for pediatric supplements to a 
drug application.
167  The Orphan Drug Act
168 provides similar incentives to develop drugs that 
lack a large consumer demand, including an additional seven years of market exclusivity, tax 
                                                 
159 Outterson et. al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 61, at 562.  He argues that “[w]ildcard patents are essentially 
a hidden tax on heart disease, depression, and other common ailments to fund antimicrobial research and 
development.” Id. (citations omitted).  Outterson further suggests that “[d]irect financing would be more transparent 
and efficient, especially since the projected cost per drug exceeds the industry’s average research and development 
costs by a factor of ten or more.” Id. 
160 Kapczynski, supra note 144, at 265.  
161 See Schulman, supra note 14, at 255. 
162 See generally Love & Hubbard, supra note 144; Kapczynski, supra note 144.   
163 For instance, Kevin Outterson recommends that we rely on market forces, noting that the market can tolerate 
increased prices for antibiotics to such an extent that pharmaceutical companies will be incentivized to re-engage in 
R&D.  He argues that this be done principally through reimbursement rates and increased prices for antibiotic 
treatments.  See Outterson, Reply, supra note 154, at 213.   
164 See BAD BUGS, supra note 11, at 24. 
165 Orphan diseases or conditions are those that “affect fewer than 200,000 individuals in the United States,” or 
diseases or conditions that “provide no reasonable expectation that the sales of the drug will recover the costs of 
development.”  Id. at 23.  
166 Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002) (codified as amended in various sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 
U.S.C.). 
167 See BAD BUGS, supra note 11, at 23. 
168 Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360aa-ee (1998)). 31 
 
incentives of up to fifty percent for clinical research, and research grants.
169  Supporters of this 
approach also argue that extending the patent term will provide the additional benefit of 
promoting antibiotic stewardship, as the pharmaceutical company will feel less compelled to 
engage in wasteful marketing of the drug during the early years of the patent term.
170    
  Those who disagree with proposals to extend the life of the antibiotic patent in order to 
stimulate R&D investment argue that longer patent terms are a “financially 
inefficient...innovation mechanism.”
171  They employ arguments similar to those used in the 
wild-card patent context to cast doubt on the patent system’s ability to efficiently incentivize 
R&D.  They point out that only 17.5% of the incremental revenue a company receives through 
patent rents (or the higher prices a company is able to charge during the patent term) is directed 
towards research and development.  Given current revenue figures, Kevin Outterson argues that 
patent extensions would only result in $910 million in additional R&D, a figure that industry 
estimates suggest would only produce “one new antimicrobial drug...developed per year, after a 
delay of more than a decade” spent in research, development and clinical testing.
172   
                                                 
169 See BAD BUGS, supra note 11, at 23. 
170 Eric Kades is one of the more extreme proponents of this position.  He argues that an unlimited patent term 
would be socially optimal for antibiotic conservation, because otherwise a limited-term patent holder of an 
exhaustible resource would deplete the entire supply of that resource. Kades, supra note 2, at 651.  He argues that a 
risk-averse society would prefer “an exhaustible resource monopoly without any time constraint” in order to “stretch 
out the useful life of the resource” and accept the higher prices associated with an unlimited patent term.  Id. at 652.   
Kevin Outterson takes issue with many of Kades’ arguments, instead proposing that patent terms are an 
ineffective way to address antibiotic conservation.  First, Outterson notes that bacteria do not develop exclusive 
resistance to a particular patented antibiotic, but rather to the class of antibiotics of which that drug is a part.  See 
Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 18, at 94 (“[T]he biology of resistance pays no attention to...patent 
doctrines...Resistance may develop against a particular mode of action rather than to a specific patented molecule.”).  
For a patent-based conservation strategy to be at all workable, there would need to be coordination among all of the 
patent-holders and generic producers within a class.  To do this, competition laws would need to be relaxed to 
permit this type of cooperation, or the patent system itself would need to be overhauled such that patents were 
granted on a class-wide basis.  There are a host of problems associated with these approaches, and it would be 
unclear whether they would actually produce optimal conservation results. See Outterson, Legal Ecology of 
Resistance, supra note 28, at 671-73. 
171 Outterson et. al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 61, at 562. 
172 Id. 32 
 
  Another criticism of using patent extensions to promote innovation concerns the 
relatively marginal effect that a patent extension has on the antibiotic’s net present value, a figure 
which is comprised of the discounted value of the drug’s projected future revenue streams.  The 
more distant in the future a revenue stream is, the less it is valued at “time zero,” or the time at 
which the pharmaceutical company has to decide whether to invest in developing an antibiotic as 
opposed to another type of drug.  The prospect of additional revenue streams in twenty years 
(i.e., the effect of a patent extension) will do little to incentivize the pharmaceutical company to 
act at the crucial moment when they are deciding how to allocate their R&D resources.
173  As 
Kevin Outterson explains, “for a best-selling antibiotic, even a substantial extension to the patent 
term would increase the net present value of cash flows by a modest amount.”
174      
  Prize Systems.  Advocates of prize systems offer an alternative approach to the patent 
system as a means to stimulate investment in pharmaceutical research and development.  James 
Love and Tim Hubbard aptly explain this view:  
The  current  [patent-based]  system  of  financing  research  and  development...for 
new  medicines  is  deeply  flawed  by  the  impact  of  high  prices  on  access  to 
medicine,  the  wasteful  spending  on  marketing  and  R&D  for  medically 
unimportant products, and the lack of investment in areas of greatest public  
  interest and need.
175 
 
They argue that prizes remedy these pitfalls associated with our reliance on patent systems to 
generate research and development.  Instead of granting pharmaceutical companies temporary 
monopolies over their drug discoveries, under a prize system the government would award 
                                                 
173 Assume an antibiotic has $200 million in annual revenues during the patent term.  This is a reasonable 
assumption, given that vancomycin had $203.7 million in sales in 2007 and $232.8 million in 2008.  See Outterson, 
Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 662.  Given a 5% discount rate, a cash flow of $200 million in Year 
21 would only be worth $71,790 today.  This amount is not going to increase the profitability profile of antibiotics 
such that it becomes equivalent to the other potential blockbuster drugs in which the pharmaceutical company could 
choose to invest.  Wild-card patent systems seem to address this concern, but also come with their own criticisms.  
My calculation was performed with Microsoft Excel.  Any errors are my own.     
174 Id. at 645. 
175 Love & Hubbard, supra note 144, at 1520.  33 
 
innovators with a large monetary payment that would be “tied to the actual impact of the 
invention on the improvements in health care outcomes....”
176  Pharmaceutical companies would 
take the cash prizes in exchange for the ability to charge monopoly prices; the new drugs would 
then immediately enter the public domain at cost pricing.
177  Although prize systems have often 
been suggested in the context of trying to improve the development of drugs to combat diseases 
that mainly afflict poor populations (and thus those drugs that would be overlooked by 
companies relying on monopoly pricing to generate returns),
178 there has been an increased 
amount of attention on prizes as a viable policy option to reform the business model for the way 
we create medicine in this country.
179  Prizes de-link the innovation incentive of payment from 
the market signal of pricing.  Thus, companies would be incentivized to pursue those drugs that 
are the most medically important as determined by the size of the potential prize,
180 rather than 
those drugs with the largest market potential, such as me-too drugs following on the heels of 
blockbuster medications that may have a large market demand but do little to advance medically 
important objectives.  The use of prize systems thus has particular resonance in the antibiotic 
space, as the commercial market for antibiotics is not profitable enough to independently 
                                                 
176 Id. 
177 See Kades, supra note 2, at 646.  
178 See generally Love & Hubbard, supra note 144, at 1527. 
179 See id. at 1521 n.2 and citations therein for a complete list of scholarship.  Prizes are often suggested as a 
superior way to incentivize the production of “knowledge goods,” which are costly to create and “non-rival” in use.  
Id. at 1528.  Prize systems have become a politically feasible option, as in 2005 then Representative Bernie Sanders 
introduced in the 109th Congress H.R. 417 – a piece of legislation entitled the Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act – 
which proposed supplementing our current patent system with a prize system.  See id. at 1532-34, for further 
discussion on the mechanics of this particular piece of legislation.  As William Sage and David Hyman note, the 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 offers a non-monetary prize of tradable “‘priority review 
vouchers’ for expedited FDA review of unrelated products [to] companies that develop therapies for neglected (less 
profitable) diseases.”  Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 810-11.      
180 The standard by which the medical importance of a given drug is determined would be set by the operator of the 
prize fund – namely the government.  Some examples include tying the prize reward to the drug’s impact on an 
individual’s quality adjusted life years.  See Love & Hubbard, supra note 144, at 1531.   34 
 
incentivize pharmaceutical companies to engage in optimal levels of research and 
development.
181   
  The main drawback of a prize-system approach is its complete sidestepping of the market 
to determine the value of medical innovation.  As Amy Kapczynski notes, “the ability to 
disassociate incentives from the market is both the promise and the peril of a prize scheme.”
182  
Many are reluctant to “abandon a system of prices determined by actual market transactions as 
the method of determining the value of a knowledge good” in favor of a system of prices set by 
the government.
183  Other critics of prize funds in the specific context of antibiotics argue that 
cost-based pricing of antibacterial drugs will lead to excessive use, which will in turn speed up 
resistance rates.
184  Also, given the current budget climate in Washington D.C., it seems that 
there is little political will to increase the federal budget to create the prize fund.
185    
  Recommendations.  After much consideration, this author believes that we need a more 
nuanced set of policies to incentivize antibiotic innovation than an exclusive reliance on the 
patent system, which in operation works to be a relatively blunt mechanism to achieve the 
specific goal of increasing investment of antibiotic research and development.  To encourage 
investment in antibiotic development, we should offer pharmaceutical companies monetary 
incentives that they can take advantage of in the near term, as opposed to patent extensions in the 
                                                 
181 See supra Part III.A for further discussion. 
182 Kapczynski, supra note 144, at 265. 
183 Love & Hubbard, supra note 144, at 1528.  Proponents of prize systems offer several responses to this criticism, 
as there has been much literature on the appropriate design of prize funds.  For instance, Michael Kremer proposed a 
patent buyout system to purchase patent rights based on values set by an auction.  See Michael Kremer, Patent 
Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998).  For further analysis on patent 
design systems, see generally Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003).      
184 See Kades, supra note 2, at 646-47 (noting that because antibiotics are an exhaustible resource, “[p]rices in 
excess of cost, though perhaps not as high as monopoly prices, are positively desirable.”). 
185 The size of the fund would not be insubstantial; H.R. 417 initially proposed a prize budget set at 0.5 percent of 
United States GDP.  See Love & Hubbard, supra note 144, at 1532.  Although Senator Sanders re-introduced a 
version of H.R. 417 in the Senate in 2007, no further progress seems to have been made on the bill.   35 
 
form of continued marketing exclusivity that will not take effect for another twenty years.
186  
These monetary incentives should be related to the value the medical community places on 
developing new antibiotics, as opposed to wild-card patent extensions whose price tag could vary 
dramatically depending on which top-selling drug the pharmaceutical company elects to be 
extended.  As Amy Kapczynski appropriately notes, “[i]t is easy to see why [wild-card patents] 
would be attractive to leading pharmaceutical companies, but far less clear why it makes sense 
from the perspective of innovation economics.”
187   
  Examples of such near-term monetary incentives could include tax credits for research 
and development, or perhaps more importantly, direct funding from the government with levels 
tied to certain research programs.  This funding could take the form of prizes, direct government 
grants, government funding of clinical trials for promising candidate antibiotics, or, more 
aggressively, a government buyout of the patent itself.
188  Given that the complete dismantling of 
the patent system seems like a political unlikelihood, we should find ways to work within the 
current framework to incentivize antibiotic innovation.  Examples of working within our current 
patent framework could include providing a guaranteed market (or advance purchase 
commitments) by the government or offering higher reimbursement rates by insurance 
companies.
189    
                                                 
186 As many other commentators have noted, the task of antibiotic research and development should be left to large 
pharmaceutical companies, rather than the government or smaller biotechnology companies.  Although the 
government is often engaged in basic research, it is a “relatively inefficient drug developer and marketer.”  Kades, 
supra note 2, at 654.  It is notable that “‘no government has successfully discovered and developed an antibiotic, and 
it is unlikely that any public body would have the resources or technical ability to do this.’” Sonderholm, supra note 
148, at 241 (citation omitted).  
187 Kapczynski, supra note 144, at 265.  
188 See id. at 266; Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 677 (discussing the possibility of 
government buyout or the development of a Strategic Antibiotic Reserve).    
189 See Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 645-55 (discussing the use of insurance 
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  Antibiotics present a special challenge because we need to incentivize innovation at the 
same time that we want to incentivize delayed usage of newly developed drugs in order to 
preserve their effectiveness.  Accordingly, the signals for innovation and the signals for market 
use should be de-linked in order to achieve an optimal antibiotic resistance policy.
190  The 
following section thus briefly explores this second set of policy considerations – namely, how to 
encourage appropriate antibiotic usage and conservation through such market signals.    
B.  Developing Incentives for Optimal Antibiotic Usage 
  Conservation (i.e., regulating antibiotic usage) is a necessary approach to achieve an 
overall reduction in antibiotic resistance, especially since we cannot guarantee the efficacy of 
and speed at which new antibiotics are developed pursuant to increased investments in 
antimicrobial research and development.
191  Industry estimates suggest that it takes nearly ten 
years for a new drug to reach the market from its day of discovery, which means that even if the 
new financial incentives to increase antibiotic R&D expenditure were put into effect today, we 
would likely have to wait until 2021 for a new drug to be available.
192  In the interim, 
conservation has to be a key approach in the effort to preserve antibiotic effectiveness.  There is 
already an extensive legal and medical literature on the topic of antibiotic conservation; this 
paper does not seek to summarize all of the potential policy options here.
193  Rather, this section 
will review the use a market-based strategy to alter consumer use of antibiotics.       
   Price Discrimination.  Antibiotics are both too cheap and too expensive, depending on 
the patient at issue.  If the negative resistance externality outweighs the individual benefit and 
                                                 
190 This is advocated by prize system proponents.  I offer it not to justify prize systems per se, but to show that 
incentivizing innovation through market pricing does not make sense when you want the market and innovation to 
act in ways that are at odds with each other.  
191 See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text for discussion of the potential difficulties of finding new and 
effective antibiotics.   
192 See BAD BUGS, supra note 11, at 3. 
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positive public health externality from the use of the antibiotic, then that antibiotic is priced too 
cheaply for that particular patient; she will thus engage in excessive antibiotic use because she is 
not required to pay the full cost of treatment.  Conversely, when the reverse situation holds with 
a presented patient, then that same antibiotic would be priced too high.  This author believes that 
the medical industry should be able to discriminate between these two users in price to make 
each bear her true cost of taking the course of antibiotic treatment.       
  Commentators have acknowledged that market prices do have the ability to affect patient 
behavior.  Namely, a patient is more likely to engage in overuse or misuse of antibiotics if the 
drug costs less than the benefit (physical or psychological) they receive from obtaining the 
prescription.
194  As William Sage and David Hyman describe: 
[M]aking healthcare more affordable might actually increase antibiotic overuse.  
Stated  bluntly,  a  patient  who  receives  an  “unnecessary”  prescription  for  an 
antibiotic is more likely to have it filled if it costs $4 at Wal-Mart (or is free at a 
Giant  supermarket)  than  if  it  costs  $25  at  the  local  drugstore.
195      
 
Many in the medical community have expressed concern over reduced-price antibiotic 
prescription programs for this reason.
196   
   What would price discrimination look like in the antibiotic market?  The traditional 
account of price discrimination provides that a firm maximizes gains from trade with its 
customers when it is able to price its product according to each customer’s willingness to pay 
(i.e., according to where the customer falls on the demand curve).
197  Thus, price is based on how 
much the individual values the product at issue.  Eric Kades offers that price discrimination as 
applied to antibiotics would entail a patent holder charging lower prices for low-value uses of its 
                                                 
194 See Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 805-06 (noting that consumers may misperceive risks).   
195 Id. at 805. 
196 See Alliance for Prudent Use of Antibiotics Consumer Fact Sheet on Free or Discounted Antibiotic Promotions 
(Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/Patients/consumerfactsheetfreeantibiotics2-09-09.pdf.  
197 See Kades, supra note 2, at 647 (usually price discrimination is discussed in the context of monopoly firms). 38 
 
drug (e.g., mild infections treatable by many antibiotics) and higher prices for high-value uses of 
the drug (e.g., serious infections only susceptible to the patent holder’s antibiotic).
198  This 
proposal tracks the traditional account’s emphasis on pricing the product according to the 
individual’s willingness to pay for it.   
  This author, however, believes that if preservation of antibiotic effectiveness is the end-
goal, the critical measure should not be the individual’s subjective willingness to pay, but the 
individual’s objective need for the drug, adjusted to take into account the positive public health 
externality and negative resistance externality.
199  This model would suggest an opposite 
outcome from the one Kades predicted: low-value uses of antibiotics, as measured by an 
objective test, should cost more, and high-value uses of antibiotics should cost less.
200  Such a 
paradigm makes sense if the goal is to discourage unnecessary or low-value antibiotic use and 
encourage (or at least remain neutral to) necessary or high-value use.
201  Admittedly, determining 
between these two types of uses would be a difficult task, and enforcement might prove to be an 
issue as well.  These challenges, although real, should not deter policymakers from devising a 
market-signal approach to antibiotic conservation based on directing consumer behavior towards 
only those socially valuable uses of antibiotics.
202 
                                                 
198 Id.  
199 For example, the price of the antibiotic could vary depending on whether the prescribing doctors performed tests 
to determine whether the infection was bacterial or viral or whether the prescribing doctor believes that the infection 
will clear up on its own without the use of antibiotics.  Similarly, broad-spectrum antibiotics could be more 
expensive if tests were not done to assess whether the infection is susceptible to a narrow-spectrum drug.  See Sage 
& Hyman, supra note 1, at 805-06 (discussing the problem of overprescribing “big-gun” broad-spectrum 
antibiotics). 
200 This is consistent with a strategy to impose a Pigovian tax on antibiotic use when it is associated with negative 
externalities.  See Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 806-07.  
201 Cf. Schulman, supra note 14, at 237 (“If a pharmaceutical company developed an antibiotic that was effective 
against [high-priority resistant bacteria], it would be most beneficial from a public health perspective to ‘save’ the 
antibiotic for these infections and not to use it on bacteria that can be effectively treated by other antibiotics.”). 
202 Commentators have noted problems with relying on market signals in the pharmaceutical market, largely because 
of the presence of market intermediaries, such as health insurance companies or hospitals, which bear the brunt of 
the cost; the individual patient bears only a small portion of the actual cost of the product.  See id. at 805; see also 
Outterson, Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 28, at 645-55, for an interesting discussion on the role of 39 
 
CONCLUSION 
  Antibiotic resistance poses a serious threat to public health.  In order to properly counter 
such resistance, we need to financially incentivize development of antibiotics and to use the 
drugs we currently have in a more rationed manner.  Because conservation and antibiotic 
production work at cross-purposes, it is essential to understand how they interact in order to 
develop appropriate resistance-reduction strategies.  Given the current standoff in Congress over 
the fiscal budget, it does not seem likely that the government will be able to fund antibiotic 
programs without the assistance of the private market.  Thus, we need to re-enlist the major 
pharmaceutical companies into the antibiotic space by providing them with the promise of a 
sufficient monetary reward for successful new therapies.  Moreover, the implementation of a 
market-signal based conservation program would be a step towards altering consumer behavior 
to more accurately reflect the true cost of antibiotic usage.      
    
 
                                                                                                                                                            
insurance reimbursement as an important policy lever.  I do not argue with these observations; rather, I would try to 
work within the ways that consumers (and doctors) are charged for antibiotic use to raise or reduce the costs they 
face.      